FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

AUGUST 9, 2016

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives

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Results in Brief

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives

August 9, 2016

Objective

Our audit objective was to determine whether the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) effectively managed initiatives for rapid deployment on the battlefield. Specifically, we evaluated JIDA processes for identifying, validating, and prioritizing requirements for countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and for developing, demonstrating, and delivering solutions to the battlefield.

Finding

When followed, JIDA processes to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for counter-IEDs and to develop, demonstrate, and deliver solutions to the battlefield were effective. However, JIDA was unable to finalize conclusions on required assessments of 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives because not enough data were available to analyze. The following factors contributed to the lack of data:

- Joint Staff did not make sure Services and combatant commanders completed timely assessments of the adequacy of JIDA-furnished equipment following initial delivery to theater for demonstration; and

- Army Test and Evaluation Command terminated its in-theater team's collection and reporting on the operational capabilities and limitations of counter-IED solutions because of in-theater force management reductions.

Finding (cont'd)

As a result, for the 95 initiatives, valued at $1.6 billion, JIDA spent $112.5 million for eight counter-IED initiatives without showing evidence that the solutions were proven to help the warfighter in countering IEDs.

Additionally, we determined that of the six non-statistically selected initiatives we reviewed, JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to:

- transfer one initiative to Army, the requesting service; and

- obtain a program management agreement between JIDA and the managing Service or DoD Agency for all six initiatives.

This occurred because JIDA personnel did not complete and record all required initiative documentation in their centralized database, or make sure the Director, JIDA, provided a waiver from established policy where appropriate. As a result, JIDA spent $446.8 million on the six sampled initiatives without sufficient documentation to justify transferring and assigning program management responsibilities for initiative development to the requesting service.

Recommendations

We recommend the Director, Joint Staff, establish controls to make sure the sponsors for counter-IED solutions complete an assessment of operational effectiveness and post completed assessments to the Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository. In addition, we recommend that the Director, JIDA, develop control procedures to make sure the required supporting documentation is completed and captured.

Results in Brief

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives

Management Comments and Our Responses

The Director, Joint Staff, and the Director, JIDA, agreed with all recommendations. However, their comments did not fully address what actions they planned to implement the recommendations. The Director, Joint Staff, did not state how he would make sponsors complete assessments of operational effectiveness within 6 months. Further, the Director, JIDA, did not specify the control procedures he would establish to make sure required documentation was completed. Therefore, we request the Director, Joint Staff, and the Director, JIDA, provide additional comments to this report by September 9, 2016. Please see the Recommendations Table on the following page.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Requiring Comment	No Additional Comments Required
Director, Joint Staff	1.a, 1.b	
Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency	2.a	2.b

Please provide Management Comments by September 9, 2016.

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

August 9, 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
DIRECTOR, JOINT IMPROVISED-THREAT DEFEAT AGENCY

SUBJECT: Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment
and Documentation of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives
(Report No. DODIG-2016-120)

We are providing this report for review and comment. This audit was in response to a
congressional reporting requirement. The Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency,
needs to improve management of initiatives to rapidly deploy solutions for countering improvised
explosive devices on the battlefield. Specifically, for the 95 initiatives, valued at $1.6 billion,
the Director spent $112.5 million for eight counter-improvised explosive device initiatives
without showing evidence the solutions were proven to help in protecting the warfighter from
improvised explosive devices. Additionally, the Director spent $446.8 million on the six initiatives
we reviewed without demonstrating that his personnel followed established policy to justify
management actions. We conducted this audit in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.

We considered management comments on a draft of this report. DoD Instruction 7650.03
requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Director, Joint Staff,
and Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, partially addressed Recommendations 1.a.,
1.b., and 2.a., respectively. Therefore, we request the Director, Joint Staff, and Director,
Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, provide additional comments on these recommendations
by September 9, 2016.

Please send a PDF file containing your comments to asm@dodig.mil. Copies of your comments must
have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the
/Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments
electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET).

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-9077
(DSN 664-9077).

Jacqueline L. Wicecarver
Assistant Inspector General
Acquisition and Sustainment Management

Contents

Introduction

Objective

Our audit objective was to determine whether the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency (JIDA) effectively managed initiatives[1] for rapid deployment on the battlefield. Specifically, we evaluated JIDA processes for identifying, validating, and prioritizing requirements for countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and for developing, demonstrating, and delivering solutions to the battlefield. See Appendix A for a discussion of our scope and methodology, and prior audit coverage related to the audit objectives.

This audit also addressed a congressional reporting requirement,[2] tasking the DoD Inspector General to audit processes and decisions in the development of Joint Improvised Explosive Device Analysis Tool software and the subsequent decision not to field it.

Background

In January 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) with the goal of providing timelier, integrated counter-IED solutions to warfighters' urgent operational needs. In March 2015, the Deputy Secretary of Defense designated the JIEDDO as a Combat Support Agency under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. Subsequently, in July 2015, the Deputy Secretary of Defense approved changing the agency name to JIDA. JIDA serves as the principal agency in DoD's efforts to defeat IEDs and attack IED networks.[3] Through rapid acquisition and coordination with other communities, JIDA supports combatant command efforts to develop solutions to counter-IEDs, terrorism, and insurgency. JIDA follows the processes defined in JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[4] to manage rapid acquisition efforts (initiatives) and provide warfighters with counter-IED solutions. Since 2007, JIDA has updated the JIEDDO Instruction twice. Each update improved the process for managing initiatives to meet the warfighters' urgent operational needs.

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[1] Initiatives are proposed counter-IED solutions undergoing advanced development and demonstration leading to the fielding of a counter-IED capability. An initiative can be a materiel or non-materiel component of a larger capability.

[2] House Report 114-102, to accompany H.R. 1735, The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016.

[3] JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 defines "attack the network" initiatives as focused on identifying and reducing the effectiveness of the networks that support and produce IEDs. "Defeat the Device" initiatives focus on defeating IEDs by detection, mitigation, and neutralization.

[4] Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)," December 22, 2010.

Transition, Transfer, or Termination of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives

The JIDA acquisition process as defined in JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[5] can result in transitions, transfers, or terminations of initiatives. Between October 1, 2012, and July 31, 2015, JIDA transitioned, transferred, or terminated 95 counter-IED initiatives. The following sections define initiative transition, transfer, and termination; describe the six initiatives we non-statistically selected; and provide further details for the initiatives transitioned, transferred, or terminated.

Transition

Transition occurs when responsibility of ownership, management, funding, and future development of a proven, joint counter-IED solution moves from JIDA to the Service, Agency, or combatant command receiving the solution. Upon transition, counter-IED solutions become enduring capabilities (programs of record) that are funded in the President's budget. We reviewed two initiatives that JIDA transitioned:

- Atmosphere—provides advanced training methods for use in analyzing large volumes of IED-related data across systems; and

- Sensor-Based Stabilized Remotely Operated Vehicle for Waterborne IED Inspection and Neutralization (SSR-WIN)—a remotely operated watercraft that deploys a robotic device, with a sonar camera and a mechanical arm, to reduce underwater explosive threats. The SSR-WIN improves the situational awareness of explosive ordnance disposal divers.

Transfer

Transfer occurs when responsibility of a proven, joint counter-IED solution moves from JIDA to the Service, Agency, or combatant command receiving the solution and does not become a program of record. Instead, the capability is funded and sustained only for a current conflict. We reviewed two initiatives JIDA transferred:

- Weapons Reporting Information Tool for Exploitation (WRITE), also known as Joint Improvised Explosive Device Analysis Tool—a communication software prototype that can collect, organize, and transmit IED detection information to support military planning and operations; and

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The Deputy Secretary of Defense publishes both transitions and transfers annually in a JIDA Transfer/Transition memorandum.

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[5]   JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, enclosure 2. Procedures, section 3. Continuation or Termination, and section 6. Integration Domain.

Termination

Termination occurs when JIDA ends development of an initiative. There are two primary reasons for JIDA to terminate an initiative. First, there is no longer a mission requirement for the solution the initiative would provide. Second, the initiative failed to provide a proven counter-IED solution. We reviewed two initiatives that JIDA terminated:

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████████████; and

- Terra Harvest–Hyperspectral Technical Collection Exploitation Capability (TH-HYTEC)—a trailer-mounted scanning device that provides images useful in detecting IED threats.

Initiatives Transitioned, Transferred, or Terminated

Of the 95 counter-IED initiatives, JIDA transferred or transitioned 71 and terminated the remaining 24. Appendix B lists the 95 counter-IED initiatives and shows:

- the status of the initiative (transitioned, transferred, or terminated);

- whether JIDA conducted an operational assessment;

- the total value of the initiative as of April 2016; and

- whether the initiative focus was to attack the network or defeat the device.

DoD Organizations Supporting the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency

Three DoD organizations help support JIDA in completing its mission. These organizations provide JIDA with feedback regarding the effectiveness of counter-IED solutions, assistance with developing test and evaluation plans, and help in planning for the transition or transfer of initiatives.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

(FOUO) The Director, Joint Staff, provides policy guidance and fosters clear communications to the Services and Unified Commands. The Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8), assists the Director by conducting studies, analysis, and assessments; and evaluating plans, programs, and strategies. ███████████████████████████████

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Army Test and Evaluation Command

The U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) plans, integrates, and conducts experiments, developmental testing, independent operational testing, and independent evaluations and assessments to provide essential information to acquisition decision makers and commanders. ATEC supports JIDA in developing test and evaluation concept plans and by providing independent assessments of JIDA counter-IED solutions.

Army G-38: Adaptive Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices/ Explosive Ordnance Disposal Solution Division

Army G-38 is the Army focal point for counter-IED/Explosive Ordnance Disposal and performs weapons technical exploitation for both current and emerging threats supporting the DoD Asymmetric Threat Defeat capability. Army G-38 also serves as the single Army lead for synchronization, integration, and direct oversight of counter-IED initiatives transferred to the Army from JIDA.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40[7] requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls. We identified an internal control weakness with JIDA's ability to complete operational assessments and determine the benefits counter-IED initiatives had in protecting the warfighter. We also found an internal control weakness in the lack of procedures to help meet the requirements of JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

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[6] "Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," (JCIDS Manual), January 19, 2012.

[7] DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.

Finding

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Needs to Improve Assessment and Documentation of Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Initiatives

When followed, JIDA processes to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for counter-IEDs and to develop, demonstrate, and deliver solutions to the battlefield were effective. However, JIDA was unable to finalize conclusions on required assessments of 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives because not enough data were available to analyze. The following factors contributed to the lack of data:

- Joint Staff did not make sure Services and combatant commanders completed timely assessments of the adequacy of JIDA-furnished equipment following initial delivery to theater for demonstration; and

- ATEC terminated its in-theater team's collection and reporting on the operational capabilities and limitations of counter-IED solutions because of in-theater force management reductions.

As a result, for the 95 initiatives, valued at $1.6 billion, JIDA spent $112.5 million for eight counter-IED initiatives without showing evidence that the solutions were proven to help the warfighter in countering IEDs.

Additionally, we determined that of the six non-statistically selected initiatives we reviewed, JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to:

- transfer one initiative to Army, the requesting service; and

- obtain a program management agreement between JIDA and the managing Service or DoD Agency for all six initiatives.

This occurred because JIDA personnel did not complete and record all required initiative documentation in their centralized database, or make sure that the Director, JIDA, provided a waiver from established policy where appropriate. As a result, JIDA spent $446.8 million on the six sampled initiatives[8] without sufficient documentation to justify transferring and assigning program management responsibilities for initiative development to the requesting service.

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[8] Two of these six initiatives also did not have an assessment to determine whether the initiatives had proven benefits in protecting the warfighter from IEDs.

Agency Had Not Finalized Conclusions on Assessments of Initiatives for Countering Improvised Explosive Devices

When followed, JIDA processes to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for counter-IEDs and to develop, demonstrate, and deliver solutions to the battlefield were effective. However, we determined JIDA was unable to finalize conclusions on required assessments of 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives (8.4 percent), valued at $112.5 million, transferred or transitioned between October 2012 and July 2015. The Director, JIDA, stated that, while JIDA conducted these eight assessments, sufficient data were not available to finalize conclusions about these initiatives' performance, so JIDA evaluated the assessments as having "insufficient data to assess." The Director, JIDA, also stated that JIDA had independently conducted tests of these initiatives to understand the nature of their baseline performance. However, these tests did not provide the Director the information needed to finalize conclusions about the initiatives' performance.

> We determined JIDA was unable to finalize conclusions on required assessments of 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives (8.4 percent), valued at $112.5 million, transferred or transitioned between October 2012 and July 2015.

JIDA needed these assessments as evidence to prove these initiatives helped protect the warfighter from IEDs. The JIDA briefing "Initiative Operational Assessment Process Review," which JIDA personnel provided to the audit team on September 2, 2015, explains that performing operational assessments allows them to identify initiatives as:

- proven to provide effective protection against IEDs;
- proven with limitations (partially satisfies requirements with some limitations in capability); or
- ineffective (does not satisfy requirements in an operational environment).[9]

JIDA transitioned one and transferred seven of the eight initiatives to the Services, Agencies, and combatant commands.

In addition to the eight initiatives discussed above, JIDA transitioned or transferred another eight initiatives for which JIDA personnel stated they did not need to perform operational assessments for various reasons, such as the Services:

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[9] An initiative is in an operational environment when it is under the control of the warfighter and used in the conduct of combat operations.

- wanting to fund and perform additional developmental work independently; or

- requesting JIDA to transfer or transition initiatives to allow the Services to accelerate existing acquisition programs.

Although we agree that JIDA did not need to perform operational assessments on these eight initiatives, JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[10] establishes completing an operational assessment as a criterion for initiating the transition or transfer of an initiative to a Service or Agency. The Instruction also allows the Director, JIDA, to authorize exceptions to its requirements, when deemed necessary and appropriate. However, JIDA personnel did not request the Director to authorize waivers of the operational assessment requirement. See Appendix B, tables 1 and 2, for the breakout of initiatives that JIDA transitioned and transferred to the Services, Agencies, or combatant commands.

Decreased Outside Support Hindered Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency in Reviewing Initiatives

JIDA was unable to complete required assessments on the eight initiatives because not enough data were available to analyze. Therefore, JIDA could not document how well the equipment it furnished through these initiatives performed.

Services and Combatant Commanders Not Completing Assessments

Joint Staff did not make sure Services and combatant commanders completed timely assessments of the adequacy of JIDA-furnished equipment following initial delivery to theater for demonstration. JIDA needed the data Services and combatant commanders should have collected on the effectiveness of JIDA-furnished equipment following initial in-theater delivery. The JCIDS Manual[11] requires the sponsor, such as DoD Components and applicable organizations, to assess rapidly fielded capability solutions delivered to operational users within 90 days of initial fielding. The JCIDS Manual stated these assessments "facilitate transition, sustainment, or alternate approaches," and sponsors must post the assessments to the JCS Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository when completed. The February 12, 2015, version of the JCIDS Manual continued this assessment requirement, but allowed sponsors 6 months to complete the assessments. The JCIDS Manual requirement applies to all capability solutions delivered in response to a Joint Urgent Operational Need or a Joint Emergent Operational Need.

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[10] JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, enclosure 2. Procedures, section 6, Integration Domain.

[11] "Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," (JCIDS Manual), January 19, 2012.

The JCS Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) did not make sure the Services and combatant commanders met the JCIDS requirements for performing capability assessments. We requested the J-8 personnel search the Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository to determine whether sponsors posted assessments for the four counter-IED solutions we reviewed that had transitioned or transferred and were associated with a validated Joint Urgent Operational Need. The J-8 found no posted assessments for the four counter-IED solutions.

> The JCS Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8) did not make sure the Services and combatant commanders met the JCIDS requirements for performing capability assessments.

The absence of sponsor postings resulted from a lack of effective control procedures within J-8 to make sure sponsors performed and posted required capability assessments. On March 7, 2016, the Chief of the J-8 Joint Requirements Assessment Division stated J-8 personnel had sent e-mails requesting sponsors to submit completed assessments to the Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository. The Chief also stated J-8 personnel sent periodic reminders to sponsors and Service requirement organizations requesting that sponsors complete assessments on initiatives within 6 months of fielding. However, because the Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository did not include any assessments for the six counter-IED solutions we reviewed, the J-8 e-mails had not been effective.

The JCIDS Manual requires sponsor assessments to provide feedback on whether fielded solutions met capability requirements. JIDA personnel need sponsor feedback to help determine the operational effectiveness of the counter-IED solutions in theater. Therefore, the Director, Joint Staff, should establish controls to make sure the sponsors of counter-IED solution complete assessments of operational effectiveness and post completed assessments to the Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository for solutions JIDA delivers in response to validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs or Joint Emergent Operational Needs. (Recommendation 1)

Army Test and Evaluation Command Terminated Forward Operational Assessment Team

ATEC personnel stated they terminated their in-theater team's collection and reporting on the operational capabilities and limitations of counter-IED solutions because of in-theater force management reductions. JIDA personnel stated they had used input from the ATEC Forward Operational Assessment team to help

them in performing operational assessments, but ATEC no longer employed this team. JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[12] requires that the JIDA Initiative Evaluation Team conduct in-theater operational assessments following delivery capabilities in theater. ATEC employed the Forward Operational Assessment team from January 2005 through December 2013, to collect in-theater data on counter-IEDs and other Army systems to support acquisition decisions. Members of the ATEC team embedded with operational units in Kuwait, Iraq, and Afghanistan served as testers and liaisons between the soldiers and Army Headquarters. ATEC did not notify JIDA when in December 2013, it terminated the Forward Operational Assessment team's collection and reporting on the operational capabilities and limitations of counter-IED solutions and other Army systems. On January 11, 2016, ATEC personnel in the Office of the Associate Director of Test Management stated they did not notify JIDA personnel prior to terminating the Forward Operational Assessment team. ATEC did not notify JIDA personnel because ATEC was still conducting Army-required operational assessments.

JIDA personnel stated that after ATEC terminated the Forward Operational Assessment team in December 2013, JIDA relied on its own personnel to gather data supporting operational assessments of counter-IED solutions. However, unlike ATEC's Forward Operational Assessment team, JIDA personnel gathered data for the majority of assessments after military units returned from theater. JIDA personnel stated its data-gathering efforts included:

- interviews with soldiers and technical analysts;
- operational research system analyst surveys;
- military unit after-action reports; and
- program manager and contractor tests and evaluations of counter-IED solutions performed in the continental United States.

On October 26, 2015, ATEC personnel told us about an alternative to using forward operational teams for collecting data on initially fielded systems. This alternative, known as an expeditionary operational assessment, would involve collecting performance data on initially fielded counter-IED solutions and other Army systems. However, ATEC personnel would not collect assessment data in theater. ATEC personnel had not developed formal plans to conduct expeditionary operational assessments. Subsequently, on January 11, 2016, ATEC personnel stated the Command began working with the Army Quick Reaction Capability Integrated Product Team to develop processes and procedures for rapid capability assessments. ATEC personnel stated Integrated Product Team efforts included developing processes for expeditionary operational assessments.

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[12]   JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, enclosure 3. Continuous Evaluation, section 3. Procedures.

Agency Did Not Always Justify Key Management Decisions

We determined that of the six non-statistically selected initiatives we reviewed, JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to justify management actions for developing counter-IED solutions. Specifically, we identified the following:

- JIDA deviated from procedures for transferring counter-IED solutions to the Service for the WRITE initiative; and

- JIDA did not establish and update program management agreements for Service or Agency management of the Atmosphere, WRITE, Highland I, TH-HYTEC, Highland II (Bagpipes), and SSR-WIN initiatives.

JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[13] requires specific documentation to support JIDA's management decisions regarding the following processes for rapid acquisition of counter-IED solutions:

- disposition of counter-IED solutions (transitioning or transferring solutions to Services, Agencies, or combatant commanders or terminating solution development initiatives); and

- establishing acquisition chains of authority from the Director, JIDA, to the Service or Agency program manager responsible for executing JIDA-funded initiatives.

Initiative Transferred to Army as an Unproven Capability

JIDA transferred the WRITE initiative to the Army as an unproven capability. JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[14] states a solution transfer should occur only after:

- an initiative becomes a proven counter-IED capability; and

- the Director, JIDA, and Deputy Secretary of Defense determine, in coordination with the Service, Agency, or combatant command sponsor, that a capability fulfills a temporary, conflict-related requirement.

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> JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to justify management actions for developing counter-IED solutions.

(FOUO) ███████████████████████████
██████████████████████ In January 2012, the Chief of the JIDA
Capabilities Integration and Weapons Technical Intelligence Division sent an
e-mail to the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) project manager
stating that JIDA leadership was looking to stand down its efforts completely and
transition the current untested version of the WRITE to the DCGS-A program.
The Chief asked for confirmation that DCGS-A was prepared to continue the
development of the WRITE templates and profiles, in addition to the live data
testing. The DCGS-A project manager responded that DCGS-A had already
contracted with the WRITE contractor to support the WRITE integration into
DCGS-A program architecture. JIDA personnel stated that they moved to transfer
the WRITE capability to the Army as rapidly as possible, to avoid redundant
investment. As a result, in April 2013, with both Deputy Secretary of Defense
and Joint Requirements Oversight Council approval, JIDA transferred the WRITE
initiative to the Army.

After the JIDA transferred the initiative, the Army spent $10.9 million over 2 years
and determined the WRITE would not provide the expected capabilities. The Army
then decided that the costs to implement WRITE and its $100,000 annual license
fees were not worth the capabilities the WRITE would provide. During audit
interviews, personnel in the Adaptive Counter-IED/Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Solution Division (G-38) stated that it would be difficult to conduct an operational
assessment on the proposed quick-reaction capability because there was no unit or
organization that had an operational requirement for the WRITE. Personnel in the
Distributed Common Ground System-Army Program Office stated the Army planned
to integrate portions of the WRITE software into the DCGS-A program to enhance
situational awareness.

Establishing and Updating Agreements for Program Management

We determined that JIDA and the sponsors did not follow established policy for
ensuring that program management agreements were in place for the six initiatives
reviewed. JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[15] states that JIDA does not have assigned
program managers, and therefore must rely on those from the Services and
Agencies to execute JIDA-funded initiatives. Accordingly, the Instruction requires
sponsors to designate a program manager for each initiative, beginning no later
than the start of solution development or demonstration. The Instruction also
requires the Director, JIDA; the program manager; and the program manager's

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[15]   JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 enclosure 4 Program Management, section 1. Assignment of Program Managers.

immediate supervisor to establish and sign a program management agreement. Sponsors provided program managers for the six initiatives we reviewed; however, JIDA and the sponsor managers did not establish program management agreements.

Instead of program management agreements, JIDA personnel used initiative decision memoranda signed only by the Director, JIDA. The memoranda did not have the signature agreement of the program manager and the program manager's immediate supervisor. The memoranda for the six initiatives authorized moving the initiatives into solution development or demonstration, and contained some information required in JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[16] for program management agreements. We determined the memoranda did not represent agreements between JIDA and the sponsors for managing the initiatives, and it only directed the assigned program manager to:

- acknowledge receipt of the memorandum;
- acknowledge receipt of the inherent direction within the memorandum; and
- perform certain assigned duties to manage the initiative.

There was no documentation to substantiate that the program managers formally accepted the terms and conditions set forth in the memoranda. JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[17] states that the program management agreement establishes the acquisition chain of authority from the Director, JIDA, to the program manager. The Instruction further differentiates program management agreements from the initiative decision memoranda by requiring annual updates of program management agreements, or more frequently if the conditions that formed the basis for the agreements change. An initiative decision memorandum is a one-time authorization to move an initiative into development or demonstration of a solution.

On April 6, 2016, JIDA personnel stated that they had not used program management agreements because they involved lengthy staffing processes. JIDA personnel explained that JIDA used other controls to ensure program managers adhere to initiative cost, schedule, and performance. JIDA controls included system and program reviews, assessments, and meetings with program managers. However, JIDA personnel also stated that they would explore the use of the DD Form 1144 "Support Agreement" to document agreements with program managers moving forward, and that they would update JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 accordingly.

JIDA's use of the DD Form 1144 Support Agreement and an update of JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 would document that program managers have accepted the terms and conditions in the initiative decision memoranda. The DD Form 1144

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[16] JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 enclosure 4 Program Management, section 2. Program Management Agreements (PMAs) requires the program management agreement to include program requirements, funding, and execution plans.

[17] JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 enclosure 4 Program Management, section 2. Program Management Agreements (PMAs).

provides a bilateral (two-party) agreement between JIDA and the Service or Agency concerning the support the program manager will provide. While the other controls JIDA personnel cited are useful in keeping initiatives on track, they do not replace the need for a two-party agreement to establish upfront what JIDA expects from program managers for the successful execution of an initiative.

Better Procedures Needed for Meeting Process Documentation Requirements

JIDA personnel did not complete and record all required initiative documentation in their centralized database, or make sure that the Director, JIDA, provided a waiver from established policy where appropriate. JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01[18] identifies the documentation needed to support each management decision point. JIDA management was already aware of the need to improve document collection for all initiatives.

> JIDA personnel did not complete and record all required initiative documentation in their centralized database, or make sure that the Director, JIDA, provided a waiver from established policy where appropriate.

In July 2010, the Government Accountability Office reported[19] that JIDA did not fully implement the management process for counter-IED initiatives and had missing or incomplete documentation supporting JIDA management decisions. In 2012, JIDA spent approximately $6 million on the Checkpoint database, which documents initiative information. JIDA intended the Checkpoint database to track information and documentation on all requirements and solution initiatives. However, a March 2015 JIDA Inspector General audit report[20] determined that only one division within JIDA was using Checkpoint as intended. Further, the report recommended that JIDA establish written policies for all divisions to use Checkpoint, mandate JIDA use of Checkpoint for all initiatives without exception, and require training for using Checkpoint. JIDA management agreed with the recommendations.

However, during our audit, we identified that JIDA still had missing information, such as signed program management agreements. We determined that JIDA needed better control procedures to make sure personnel substantiated management decisions and met documentation requirements. Additionally, better control procedures will help make sure there is reasonable assurance that JIDA records all initiatives funded in the system. Therefore, the Director, JIDA, needs to

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18 JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, enclosure 2. Procedures, section 4. Capability Requirements Validation (CRV) Domain; section 5. Solution Domain; and section 6. Integration Domain.

19 Government Accountability Office Report GAO-10-660, "Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal Controls," July 1, 2010.

20 Report of Audit 2015-001, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization: Rapid Capability Delivery (RCD)," March 27, 2015.

develop control procedures that make certain the supporting documentation JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 required at each management decision point is completed and captured in the Checkpoint database; and the Director, JIDA, authorizes any exceptions to the requirements in the JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01. (Recommendation 2)

Benefits of Initiatives Were Unknown and Key Management Decisions Were Not Documented

For the 95 initiatives, valued at $1.6 billion, JIDA spent $112.5 million for eight counter-IED initiatives without showing evidence that the solutions were proven to help the warfighter in countering IEDs. Also, JIDA spent $446.8 million on six sampled initiatives without sufficient documentation to justify transferring and assigning program management responsibilities for initiative development. Specifically, JIDA spent:

> JIDA spent $446.8 million on six sampled initiatives without sufficient documentation to justify transferring and assigning program management responsibilities for initiative development.

- $6.1 million on developing the WRITE initiative without verifying it was ready for transfer to the Army for use; and
- $446.8 million on six initiatives (including WRITE) without having program management agreements between JIDA and the managing Service or Agency.

JIDA transferred the WRITE initiative to the Army as an unproven capability. The Army spent an additional $10.9 million in development before deciding the cost to implement this initiative was not worth the capabilities provided. Additionally, while JIDA must depend on program managers from Services or Agencies to execute the counter-IED initiatives it funds, it had not established program management agreements with these managers defining achievable and measurable plans for executing the initiatives.

Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

The Director, Joint Staff, and the Director, JIDA, provided the following comments on the finding. For the full text of the Directors' comments, see the Management Comments section of the report.

Joint Staff Comments

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Our Response

We revised the report to include the suggested clarification regarding the requirement for performing operational assessments of counter-IED solutions.

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Comments

The Director partially agreed with the finding sections discussing performing assessments of initiatives to counter-IEDs and the transfer of an initiative to the Army. The Director stated:

- JIDA was able to conduct required assessments on 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives. However, because data was not available to analyze how well the equipment furnished through these initiatives performed, JIDA was unable to finalize conclusions about these initiatives' performance. As a result, JIDA evaluated the assessments as having "insufficient data to assess." Also, JIDA independently conducted tests of these initiatives, separate from these assessments, to understand the nature of their baseline performance.

- The Director acknowledges that the WRITE initiative was not proven before transfer to the Army. However, JIDA facilitated the transfer of this capability in accordance with the Army's wishes to do so as rapidly as possible to avoid redundant investment.

The Director agreed that JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to obtain program management agreements between JIDA and the managing Service or DoD Agency for the six initiatives we reviewed. He stated that JIDA has updated its current acquisition practice to require signed program management agreements as part of providing funding for developing material capabilities. He also stated that JIDA would continue to use initiative decision memoranda, and signed copies of documents accepting JIDA funding, as part of providing appropriate control over these investments.

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21 "Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," (JCIDS Manual), February 12, 2015.

Our Response

We have revised the report to state that JIDA did conduct assessments on the eight counter-IED initiatives, but, because of insufficient data on the initiatives performance, the initiatives were evaluated as having insufficient data to assess. We also revised the report to include the Director's assertion that JIDA had independently conducted tests of these initiatives to understand the nature of their baseline performance. However, we also noted that these tests did not provide the Director the information needed to finalize conclusions about the initiatives' performance. Finally, we revised the report to include the Director's assertion that JIDA facilitated the transfer of the WRITE initiative to the Army to avoid redundant investment.

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

Redirected and Revised Recommendation

As a result of management comments, we redirected Recommendation 1 to the Director, Joint Staff, who has the authority to implement the recommendation. We also revised the recommendation to clarify that the recommendation specifically applies to the counter-IED solutions JIDA delivers in response to a validated Joint Urgent Operational Need or a Joint Emergent Operational Need.

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Director, Joint Staff, establish controls to make sure the sponsors of counter-Improvised Explosive Device solutions that the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency delivers in response to validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs or Joint Emergent Operational Needs meet the requirements in the Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," February 12, 2015, for:

   a. **Completing an assessment of the solution's ability to deliver required capabilities within 6 months of initial delivery to operational users in theater; and**

   b. **Posting completed assessments to the Knowledge Management/Decisions Support repository maintained in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**

Joint Staff Comments

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Our Response

The Director's comments did not fully address the recommendation. His comments did not describe actions taken or planned to accomplish the recommendation. Therefore, we request the Director provide additional comments to the final report explaining JCS plans for implementing the recommendation.

Recommendation 2

We recommend the Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, develop control procedures to make sure that:

    a. **at each management decision point for initiatives, the supporting documentation is completed and captured in the Checkpoint central database; and**

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Comments

The Director, JIDA, agreed, stating that JIDA will conduct a review to ensure the Checkpoint database includes supporting documentation for each initiative at each management decision point.

Our Response

The Director's comments partially addressed the recommendation. His comments did not specify control procedures to make sure JIDA personnel implement his plan for conducting documentation reviews at initiative decision points. Specified control procedures could include updating JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, as the Director is planning in response to Recommendation 2.b, or other JIDA policy, to require conducting documentation reviews for each initiative at each management decision point. Therefore, we request the Director provide additional comments to the final report explaining how he would implement the planned documentation reviews.

    b. **the Director authorizes any exceptions to the requirements in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)," December 22, 2010.**

Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency Comments

The Director, JIDA, agreed, stating that JIDA will develop control procedures for authorizing exceptions at each decision point provided in the current JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01. The Director further stated that JIDA would update the Instruction as part of the larger update of all JIDA's governance procedures as JIDA transitions to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency on October 1, 2016.

Our Response

Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation, and no further comments are required.

Appendix A

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from July 2015 through June 2016 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We interviewed key personnel and performed fieldwork at the following organizations:

- Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J-8), Washington, D.C.;

- Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, Arlington, Virginia;

- Army Adaptive Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices/Explosive Ordnance Disposal Solution Division (G-38) and Distributed Common Ground System–Army Program Office, Washington, D.C.; and

- Army Test and Evaluation Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland.

We developed and used a checklist to determine whether JIDA effectively managed the six initiatives for rapid deployment on the battlefield. We based our checklist on the processes that JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01 requires for identifying, validating, and prioritizing requirements for counter-IEDs and for developing, demonstrating, and delivering solutions to the battlefield. We also met with JIDA personnel to discuss our checklist to make sure that it accurately captured the processes the JIEDDO Instruction requires.

We collected, reviewed, and analyzed documents dated July 2009 through May 2016 to include:

- Initiative Decision Memoranda,

- Initiative Decision Briefings,

- Transition and Transfer Memoranda,

- Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests,

- Comprehensive Cost and Requirement Reports,

- Determinations and Findings on Acquisition Under the Economy Act,

- Initiative Evaluation Plans,

- Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements, and

- Operational Assessments.

We compared these documents to the policies and guidance in the following DoD and JIDA issuances:

- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01I, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," January 23, 2015;

- "Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," February 12, 2015;

- "Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," January 19, 2012;

- DoD Directive 2000.19E, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)," February 14, 2006;

- JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)," December 22, 2010; and

- JIEDDO Instruction 5000.01, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)," November 9, 2007.

Selection of Programs to Review

We obtained multiple spreadsheets from JIDA that identified 562 initiatives, which included transitioned, transferred, and terminated initiatives from September 2010 to July 2015. We selected initiatives that had a transition, transfer, or termination memorandum between October 2012 and July 2015 and were either "attack the network" or "defeat the device" initiatives. This selection totaled 95 initiatives.

We considered the 95 initiatives, with a total value of $1.4 billion, as our audit sample. Out of the 95 initiatives, we selected a non-statistical sample of six initiatives to review, including two initiatives (one "attack the network" and one "defeat the device") for each of the possible initiative outcomes (transition, transfer, or termination). The total value of the six selected initiatives was $446.8 million. For one of the six initiatives, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016 Report of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives on H.R. 1735, Report 114-102 requested DoD Inspector General review. We selected the remaining five initiatives based on highest dollar value.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit.

Use of Technical Assistance

We consulted with the DoD Office of Inspector General Quantitative Methods Division in determining the non-statistical sample for the audit.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) issued nine reports discussing the JIDA's management of initiatives. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at http://www.gao.gov. Unrestricted DoD IG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm.

GAO

Report No. GAO-12-861R, "Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices: Multiple DOD Organizations are Developing Numerous Initiatives," August 1, 2012

Report No. GAO-12-385, "Urgent Warfighter Needs: Opportunities Exist to Expedite Development and Fielding of Joint Capabilities," April 24, 2012

Report No. GAO-12-453SP, "Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue," February 28, 2012

Report No. GAO-12-342SP, "2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue," February 28, 2012

Report No. GAO-11-318SP, "Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue," March 1, 2011

Report No. GAO-11-273, "Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consideration," March 1, 2011

Report No. GAO-10-660, "Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization's System of Internal Control," July 1, 2010

Report No. GAO-10-460, "Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs," April 30, 2010

DoD IG

D-2010-032, "DOD Countermine and Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Systems Contracts–Husky Mounted Detection System," December 31, 2009

Appendix B

Initiatives Transitioned, Transferred or Terminated between October 2012 and July 2015

We separated the 95 initiatives in our sample into three tables based on whether JIDA transitioned, transferred, or terminated the initiative. The following three tables below also show:

- the initiative focus ("attack the network" or "defeat the device");
- the value of the initiative as of April 2016;
- whether JIDA conducted an operational assessment on the performance of the initiative; and
- the Service, Agency, or combatant command that received the 71 initiatives JIDA transferred or transitioned.

In each table, we listed the initiatives from highest to lowest dollar value and highlighted the six initiatives we reviewed.

(FOUO) ███████████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 1	████	██	████	█████	██	██	██
(FOUO) 2	██████	██	████	█████	██	██	██████
(FOUO) 3	██████	██	████	█████	██	██	██████
(FOUO) 4	████	██	████	█████	██	█████	██████
(FOUO) 5	████	██	████	█████	██	██	██████
(FOUO) 6	██████	██	████	█████	██	██	██████
(FOUO) 7	████	██	████	████	██	██	██████
							(FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 1. ████████████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 8	███	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 9	█████	██	████	████	██	██	██
(FOUO) 10	████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 11	████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 12	██████	██	████	████	██	██	██
(FOUO) 13	████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 14	███	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 15	█████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 16	█████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 17	███	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 18	████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 19	████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 20	████	██	████	████	██	██	████
(FOUO) 21	████	██	████	████	██	██	████
							(FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 1. ██████████████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 22	██████	██	████	████	██	██	████████
(FOUO) 23	██████	██	████	████	██	██	████████
(FOUO) 24	██████	██	████	████	██	██	████████
(FOUO) 25	██████	██	████	████	██	██	████████
(FOUO) 26	██████	██	████	████	██	██	████████
(FOUO) 27	██████	██	████	████	██	██	████████
Total					████		
							(FOUO)

[1] These are the actual names of the initiatives.

[2] Slight rounding inconsistencies exist because auditor calculations included decimals.

(FOUO) Table 2. ██████████████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 1	██████	██	████	████	██████		████████
(FOUO) 2	████	██	████	████	██████		████
(FOUO) 3	██	██	████	████	██████		██
(FOUO) 4	██████	██	████	████	██████		████████
							(FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 2. ██████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 5	███ ██	██	███	███	███		██
(FOUO) 6	████ ██	██	███	███	███ ███	███	██
(FOUO) 7	██ ██	██	███	███	████		██
(FOUO) 8	████ ██	██	███	███	████		███
(FOUO) 9	███ ██	██	███	███	████		██
(FOUO) 10	████	██	███	███	████		██
(FOUO) 11	█████	██	███	███	██	███	████
(FOUO) 12	████ ██	██	███	███	████		████
(FOUO) 13	███ ██	██	███	███	████		█████
(FOUO) 14	█	██	███	███	███	███	██
(FOUO) 15	███ ██	██	███	███	████		██
(FOUO) 16	████	██	███	███	████		██
(FOUO) 17	████ ██	██	███	███	████		██
							(FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 2. ████████████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 18	██	██	██	████	███		████
(FOUO) 19	███	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 20	███	██	██	███	███		███
(FOUO) 21	████	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 22	████	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 23	████	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 24	█████	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 25	████	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 26	███	██	██	███	███		████
(FOUO) 27	██	██	██	███	███	████	██
(FOUO) 28	███	██	██	███	███		████
(FOUO) 29	████	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 30	██	██	██	███	███		██
(FOUO) 31	███	██	██	███	███		██
							(FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 2. ██████████████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 32	███████	███	████	██████	████ ████	████	████
(FOUO) 33	████████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 34	████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 35	█████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 36	██████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 37	████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 38	███████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 39	█████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 40	██████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 41	██████	███	████	██████	████	███	
(FOUO) 42	█████	███	████	██████	█████	██████	
(FOUO) 43	█████	███	████	██████	██	████	███
(FOUO) 44	█████	███	████	██████	████	████	███
Total					████		(FOUO)

[1] These are the actual names of the initiatives.

[2] Slight rounding inconsistencies exist because auditor calculations included decimals.

Acronyms:

USAF   United States Air Force

USMC   United States Marine Corps

SOCOM   United States Special Operations Command

(FOUO) Table 3. Initiatives Terminated Between October 2012 and July 2015

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 1	████	██	████	████	██	█	████
(FOUO) 2	█████	█	███	███	██	█	███
(FOUO) 3	██	█	███	███	██	█	███
(FOUO) 4	███	█	███	█	██	█	███
(FOUO) 5	██	█	███	███	██	█	██
(FOUO) 6	████	█	███	█	██	█	██
(FOUO) 7	█████	█	███	█	█	████	███
(FOUO) 8	███	█	███	███	██	█	███
(FOUO) 9	██	█	███	█	██	█	███
(FOUO) 10	█	█	███	█	██	█	███
(FOUO) 11	███	█	███	███	██	█	██
(FOUO) 12	███	█	███	█	██	█	███
(FOUO) 13	███	█	███	███	█	████	███
(FOUO) 14	██	█	███	███	█	███	██
							(FOUO)

(FOUO) Table 3. ██████████████████████████████

(FOUO) No.	Initiative Title[1]	FY	Action	Initiative Focus	Value as of April 2016 (in millions)	Operational Assessment	Receiving Service, Agency, or Command
(FOUO) 15	███	██	████	████	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 16	████	██	████	████	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 17	███	██	████	████	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 18	█████	██	████	██	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 19	██	██	████	████	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 20	███	██	████	██	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 21	████	██	████	██	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 22	████	██	████	████	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 23	████	██	████	██	▪	████	██
(FOUO) 24	████	██	████	██	▪	▪	██
Total					███		(FOUO)

[1] These are the actual names of the initiatives.

[2] Slight rounding inconsistencies exist because auditor calculations included decimals.

Management Comments

Director, Joint Staff, Comments

Director, Joint Staff, Comments (cont'd)

Director, Joint Staff, Comments (cont'd)

Director, Joint Staff, Comments (cont'd)

Director, Joint Staff, Comments (cont'd)

Director, Joint Staff, Comments (cont'd)

Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, Comments

JOINT IMPROVISED-THREAT DEFEAT AGENCY
5000 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-5000

JUN 2 7 2016

MEMORANDUM FOR ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: JIDA Response to the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General's final draft report, dated June 7, 2016, Project No. D2015-D000AE-0222.000

   I appreciate that the DoD IG acknowledges the important role JIDA plays in rapidly providing solutions for countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on the battlefield. As the report states, JIDA's processes to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for counter-IED solutions, and to develop, demonstrate, and deliver solutions to the battlefield are effective. I agree that these processes have demonstrated their effectiveness over time, and serve the purpose of rapidly fielding proven capabilities to the deployed warfighter. On March 11, 2015, JIDA realigned to be a Combat Support Agency. On October 1, 2016, JIDA will transition as an office under the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

   Finding 1. **JIDA's processes to identify, validate, and prioritize requirements for counter-IED solutions, and to develop, demonstrate, and deliver solutions to the battlefield are effective.** JIDA Response: Concur.

   Finding 2. **JIDA was unable to complete required assessments on 8 of 95 counter-IED initiatives because data was not available to analyze how well the equipment furnished through these initiatives performed in countering IEDs.** JIDA Response: Partially concur. JIDA conducted these 8 assessments. Because sufficient data was not available to finalize conclusions about these initiatives' performance, the assessments were evaluated, "Insufficient data to assess". It should be noted that JIDA independently conducted tests of these initiatives, separate from these assessments, to understand the nature of their baseline performance.

   Finding 3a. **JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to transfer one initiative to Army, the requesting Service.** JIDA Response: Partially concur. As noted in the DOD IG's report, JIDA transitioned the Weapons Reporting Information Tool for Exploitation (WRITE) initiative in April 2013, with both Deputy Secretary of Defense and Joint Requirements Oversight Council approval, to the Army. The DOD IG's report also acknowledges that the Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) project manager had already contracted with the WRITE contractor to support the WRITE integration into the DCGS-A program architecture, before this transition occurred. JIDA acknowledges that this initiative had not yet been proven before transition. However, in view of the Army's rapid investment action, JIDA facilitated the transfer of this capability to the Army in accordance with the Army's wishes to do so as rapidly as possible, and to avoid redundant investment.

   Finding 3b. **JIDA personnel did not follow established policy to obtain a program management agreement between JIDA and the managing Service or DoD Agency for all six initiatives.** JIDA Response: Concur. JIDA has updated its current acquisition practice to require signed Program Management Agreements as part of providing funding for developing material capability. It should be noted that JIDA used (and still uses) an Initiative Decision Memorandum, and signed copies of documents accepting JIDA funding, as part of providing appropriate management control over these investments.

Director, Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency, Comments (cont'd)

Recommendation 2a: DOD IG recommends that the Director, JIDA, develop control procedures to make sure that at each management decision point for initiatives, the supporting documentation is completed and captured in the CheckPoint central database. JIDA Response: Concur. JIDA will conduct a review to ensure CheckPoint includes supporting documentation for each initiative at each management decision point.

Recommendation 2b: DOD IG recommends that the Director, JIDA, develop control procedures to make sure that the Director authorizes any exceptions to the requirements in the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instructions 5000.01, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat (JIEDD) Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process (JCAAMP)," December 22, 2010. JIDA Response: Concur. JIDA will develop control procedures for authorizing exceptions at each decision point of the current JCAAMP. The JCAAMP instruction will be updated as part of the larger update of all JIDA's governance procedures as JIDA transitions under DTRA on October 1, 2016.

JIDA is confident the corrective actions identified above will address the internal control weaknesses identified in the DOD IG final draft report. The point of contact for this response is

MICHAEL H. SHIELDS
Lieutenant General, USA
Director

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ATEC	Army Test and Evaluation Command
DCGS-A	Distributed Common Ground System-Army
IEDs	Improvised Explosive Device
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JIDA	Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency
JIEDDO	Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
SSR-WIN	Sensor-Based Stabilized Remotely Operated Vehicle for Waterborne IED Identification and Neutralization
TH-HYTEC	Terra Harvest–Hyperspectral Technical Collection Exploitation Capability
WRITE	Weapons Reporting Information Tool for Exploitation

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